Munich Massacre

Munich Massacre

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In what became known as the Munich Massacre, eight terrorists wearing tracksuits and carrying gym bags filled with grenades and assault rifles, breached the Olympic Village at the Summer Games in Munich before dawn on September 5, 1972. The terrorists, associated with Black September, an extremist faction of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, entered the apartment complex where Israeli athletes were staying. Once inside, they murdered two members of the Israeli team and took nine others hostage. Audiences around the world then watched in horror as the international nightmare unfolded on live TV.

The terrorists demanded the release of 234 Arab prisoners from Israeli jails, as well as two German terrorists held in West German custody. When authorities attempted to rescue the hostages after a 23-hour standoff, all the hostages, one West German police officer and five Black September members were killed.

More than 900 million viewers watched coverage of the terrorist attack on TV, including the now iconic sight of a black ski mask-clad terrorist on the balcony. It was the first time an act of terror was broadcast live and took place during a major global sporting event.

Lax Security During Post-Nazi Olympic Games

Hosting its first Olympics in Germany since Adolf Hitler’s Nazi propaganda and racism-laden 1936 Summer Games in Berlin, the West German government had been looking to highlight its democracy and downplay any military presence. Hailing the event as “the Games of Peace and Joy,” and “the Cheerful Games,” West Germany eschewed uniformed soldiers and police for unarmed guards.

Less than 30 years after the end of World War II, when approximately 6 million Jews were murdered in the Holocaust, Israel entered the Munich Olympics with its biggest-ever team of officials and athletes. According to the book One Day in September by Simon Reeve, "several of them (were) older Eastern Europeans still bearing physical and mental scars from Nazi concentration camps."

Israeli officials had reportedly voiced concern about the lack of security at the Games and a 1972 New York Times report pointed to "glaring" precautionary deficiencies. The way the terrorists were able to take deadly advantage of easy access to the village would change security protocols and preparation for future Olympics.

The Terrorist Attack

Ten days into the Games, on September 5, 1972, under the cloak of darkness, the terrorists stormed the Israeli team's quarters at 4:30 a.m., having been helped over a wire fence by athletes sneaking in after a night out who mistook them for fellow Olympians.

Upon breaching the Israeli dorm, wrestling coach Moshe Weinberg and weightlifter Yossef Romano were killed almost immediately. Horrifyingly, Romano, according to the Associated Press, was castrated and Weinberg’s body was thrown to the street. Some escaped, but nine Israelis were quickly taken hostage, including weightlifters David Berger, who was born in America, and Ze’ev Friedman, wrestlers Eliezer Halfin and Mark Slavin, track and field coach Amitzur Shapira, sharpshooting coach Kehat Shorr, fencer Andre Spitzer, weightlifting judge Yakov Springer and wrestling referee Yossef Gutfreund.

A 9 a.m. deadline was set for the terrorists’ political prisoner release demands—not meeting it, they said, would result in one hostage being executed every hour.

Negotiations and Demands

With no counter-terror unit in place, the West Germans took control of the negotiations, with Munich's police chief as well as Libyan and Tunisian ambassadors to Germany, attempting to deal with the kidnappers. According to the Guardian, the terrorists rejected the offer of "an unlimited amount of money" for the release of the hostages, but did extend their deadline multiple times. At least one attempt at a rescue in the athletes’ dorm was botched when the terrorists were able to view officers approaching on TV—their electricity hadn’t been cut off.

Israel's immediate response was that there would be no negotiations. "If we should give in, then no Israeli anywhere in the world can feel that his life is safe," Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir said at the time.

With negotiations failing, the members of Black September demanded transport to Cairo and, with the hostages, were moved via two helicopters to Fürstenfeldbruck air base, about 15 miles away, where a jet was waiting. In a rescue attempt-turned bloodbath, German snipers, with no sharpshooting experience, inadequate gear, bad intelligence and no means of communication with each other, opened fire on the kidnappers. The terrorists returned fire, killing Anton Fliegerbauer, a German policeman positioned in a control tower. All nine hostages, bound in the helicopters, were killed by gunfire and a grenade.

Black September leader Luttif Afif and four other terrorists were also left dead, while three were captured alive.

Reaction and Response

Following the attack, the Games were suspended for 34 hours, with a memorial service held September 6 in Olympic Stadium that was attended by 3,000 athletes and 80,000 spectators. The rest of the Israeli team left Munich, as did Mark Spitz, the Jewish American swimmer who had already won seven gold medals at the Games, and the Egyptian, Philippine and Algerian teams, among others.

A month later, the three captured terrorists were released in a hostage exchange after the hijacking of Lufthansa Flight 615 and received a “hero’s welcome” upon arrival in Libya, according to Reuters.

Meir and Israel, meanwhile, responded with Operation Wrath of God, a covert Mossad mission to kill the masterminds behind the Munich massacre. Several suspects were assassinated in the coming months, but the mission was suspended when an innocent man was mistakenly killed in Norway in 1973. The target of that shooting, Black September Chief of Operations Ali Hassan Salameh, was assassinated by car bomb in 1979 in the operation’s final mission.

Photo Gallery


“Israeli team’s massacre overshadows sports at 1972 Olympics,” by Aron Heller, Associated Press, August 7, 2020.

"The terrorist outrage in Munich in 1972," by Simon Burnton, The Guardian, May 2, 2012.

FACTBOX: “The Munich Olympics killings and their aftermath,” by Reuters Staff, Reuters, March 7, 2012.

One Day in September: The Full Story of the 1972 Munich Olympics Massacre and the Israeli Revenge Operation 'Wrath of God,' by Simon Reeve, Simon & Schuster, 2018.

“Tragedy in Munich,” National Park Service

Germany: Serious Mistakes Made Munich Massacre Possible

Forty-eight years ago in Munich, Palestinian terrorists murdered almost the entire Israeli team at the Olympic Games. West Germany aided the culprits by making serious mistakes. One of those has not been corrected until today.

On September 5th, 1972, in the early morning hours, David Berger, a 28-year-old weight lifter, was gaining strength for the next day, by sleeping in the accommodation for the Israeli participants of the Olympic Games. He and his colleagues were expecting days of competition. They were not the only ones in Munich who were hoping for medals.

Hopeless Fight

The wrestler Eliezer Halfin, a 24-year-old pro, was part of the team. So were Zeev Friedman, another weightlifter, aged 28, and his colleague Mark Slavin, the youngest team member. He was 18. Fencing coach André Spitzer, 27 years old, was sleeping as well. So were the older members of the Israeli team.

They included weightlifting judge Yaakov Springer, track coach Amitzur Shapira, shooting coach Kehat Schorr and wrestling referee Yossef Gutfreud. Most of the older members were above 50.

When murderers of the Palestinian terror organization Black September broke into the Israeli accommodation at the Olympic village at 4:35 a.m., two Israelis tried to prevent the attack. With a lot of courage, weightlifter Yossef Romano, who was 31, and Moshe Weinberg, a wrestling coach aged 33, fought the heavily armed terrorists and were the first to be murdered.

Police Preparation on TV

It took the German authorities two hours to establish what exactly was going on. Weinberg and Romano were already dead when officers finally cordoned off the area. At around 9:00 a.m., Black September presented its list of demands. They wanted the release of far more than 200 Palestinian terrorists from Israeli jails. And they told Germany to release Ulrike Meinhof and Andreas Baader, two prominent members of the German terrorist organization Red Army Faction (RAF).

The terrorists issued an ultimatum until noon that was prolonged twice. Germany’s Interior Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher offered to be exchanged for the Israeli athletes, but Black September rejected anything of the kind. Later on, the ultimatum was extended into the evening.

Two failures on the part of the German police helped the murderers. On television, the hostage takers watched police as they were preparing to storm the building, in an attempt to free the hostages. As a result, the operation which could have saved lives was called off. The mistake was not to shut down the electricity in this part of the Olympic village and not to think of the information flow or its implications at all.

Death in Fürstenfeldbruck

At some point in the evening, the German authorities pretended to agree to demands. They let the terrorists board two helicopters with their Israeli hostages. The plan was to fly to the airport in the town of Fürstenfeldbruck, where they were supposed to board a jet to Cairo.

At the airport, the next police mistake led to the death of all hostages. Sharpshooters opened fire on two of the terrorists who were checking the aircraft. They were ordered to do so. What followed was a shootout between Black September’s murderers and the police.

At around midnight, armored police vehicles arrived. Once the terrorists saw them, they killed all hostages and blew up one of the helicopters with a grenade. In spite of the massacre, the authorities said all hostages had been freed. This announcement had to be corrected later.

German Money for PA and PLO

Because the police seemed to be clueless and obviously had no plans for operations of this kind, an elite force was founded months later. The ‘GSG-9’ team freed hostages from a Lufthansa jet hijacked by Palestinian terrorists in 1977.

Failure on the part of the Bonn government made the Munich Massacre possible in the first place. Just five months before, Black September had hijacked another Lufthansa jet full of passengers. The Federal Republic of Germany paid them millions. Without the ransom money, the Palestinian murderers would likely not have been able to come to Munich, let alone plan the Olympic Games attack.

Bonn learned from this mistake in the sense that the government never directly paid hijackers again. On the other hand, the Germans never stopped funding the Palestinian Authority, which supported terror back then and still does today, for instance by paying salaries to the families of terrorists.

The Nazi Connection

There was yet another worrisome aspect. German neo-Nazis supported the Palestinians by providing the infrastructure they needed in Europe. A prominent Nazi by the name of Udo Albrecht set up contacts between the PLO and some of his friends in the Nazi community. In July of 1972, two months before the Munich Massacre, the Federal Criminal Police Office, which is the German FBI equivalent, knew about those contacts.

On top of all of these failures and mistakes, the Olympic Committee did not take the right decisions. In spite of the hostage situation on September 5th, 1972, they let the Games continue. In the afternoon, they were interrupted for a while only. Also it took the IOC decades to agree to an appropriate commemoration event for the Munich Massacre victims at the Olympic Games.

There has never been a trial against the masterminds. Also, the Federal Republic of Germany has not stopped paying terrorists or hosting them. Mahmoud Abbas, today’s President of the Palestinian Authority, has close ties to Berlin and other European capitals. Not only does he openly admit his organization pays terrorists, whom he calls “martyrs”. He was also accused of having been part of the effort to finance the Munich Massacre in 1972. This is something he has denied.

Killed Police Man

Forty-eight years after Munich, the memory of David Berger, Eliezer Halfin, Zeev Friedman, Mark Slavin, André Spitzer, Yaakov Springer, Amitzur Shapira, Kehat Schorr, Yossef Gutfreud, Yossef Romano and Moshe Weinberg lives on. They were murdered because they were Jews. The German police officer Anton Fliegerbauer, who was killed on duty, will not be forgotten either.

Today, virtually all Jewish institutions in Germany, including synagogues and schools, are being guarded by police 24/7 because of the rising antisemitism and the danger posed by Islamist terrorists. Munich is not supposed to happen again.

How Accurate is Munich?

&ldquoThe world was watching in 1972 as 11 Israeli athletes were murdered at the Munich Olympics. This is the story of what happened next.&rdquo Thus begins the trailer for Steven Spielberg&rsquos recently Oscar-nominated film Munich. While this &ldquoinspired by a true story&rdquo movie, which covers the revenge missions the Mossad Israeli spy agency took against the group responsible for the massacre &ndash Black September &ndash has received much critical praise, the claim that it is factually accurate is suspect. Indeed, we have many reasons to believe that in a number of ways it is grossly inaccurate as a work of history.

How Accurate Was the Composition of the Group of Assassins?

Even basic facts about the Mossad&rsquos operation, such as the composition of the hit teams, are most likely depicted inaccurately in the film. According to an article by Reuters journalist Dan Williams, contrary to Munich, which portrays the group of assassins as being entirely Israeli, one of the original members of the squad was a Danish-born volunteer who was not trained by the intelligence agency. Furthermore, while the hit team in the film is composed entirely of men, former Mossad agent Gad Shimron says that teams in the field always include some women in order to avoid arousing suspicion. "It's standard practice to include female agents in such operations," he told Reuters. &ldquoAnyone who has been on a stakeout knows that having a lady on hand helps you avoid being spotted.&rdquo Shimron also said that unlike in the film, the revenge squads probably did not contain document forgers, as such personnel would not have the time necessary to produce high quality documents due to the short duration of their missions. The team of assassins was most likely much larger than the five-man group in the movie as well. Mossad veterans told Reuters that because of their high priority, every reprisal operation involves a massive number of field agents. Moreover, contrary to the film, in which then Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir handpicks the leader of the mission, Avner, Meir had nothing to do with the selection of the teams responsible for tracking down and eliminating the members of Black September involved in the massacre. Indeed, although Munich accurately portrays her as authorizing the operation, Shimron says that Meir &ldquohad nothing to do with Mossad personnel.&rdquo

How Accurate Was the Assassins&rsquo Methodology?

The film almost certainly inaccurately depicts the tactics and training of the hit teams as well. While in Munich, the group of assassins obtains the vast majority of its information from a mysterious Frenchman in actuality the Mossad agents received information from a variety of sources, such as paid informants, other Israeli case officers, and friendly European intelligence agencies. Moreover, every assassination carried out by the hit teams is depicted in the film as being done with little to no practice beforehand. Mossad veterans claim, however, that each group of agents involved in the operation underwent extensive &ldquotest runs&rdquo prior to the actual attempts. Speaking on the condition of anonymity, one former operative told Reuters, "We would set up 'models', by choosing areas in Israel that resembled the place where the person in question would be hit. Then we would drill to make sure the mission went without a hitch.&rdquo Furthermore, while Avner and his colleagues spend months tracking and killing their targets with virtually no contact with their superiors, the same former operative said that the Mossad&rsquos agents actually are in the field for a maximum of several weeks at a time.

How Accurate Were the Events of the Revenge Mission?

Munich also falsely depicts a number of events that occurred throughout the revenge squad&rsquos mission. Perhaps most significantly, it does not show the hit team&rsquos July 1973 assassination of a Moroccan man unconnected with the massacre and the series of events that followed this incident. Because the murder took place in Lillehammer, Norway, the Norwegian government began tracking the operatives, eventually capturing the aforementioned Danish volunteer. The authorities were then able to create a paper trail using the receipts he saved to locate, capture, and prosecute the rest of the team. It is to prevent such a thing, Shimron insisted, that Mossad agents are discouraged from maintaining financial records while they are in the field. &ldquoAgents are expected to account for their expenses, but not if it means incurring the risk of discovery,&rdquo he told Reuters. &ldquoThey can just as easily declare their expenses from memory when they return home, and it's accepted on trust.&rdquo It is highly unlikely, therefore, that the Mossad operatives involved in the reprisals would be required to keep their receipts, as they were in the film. Furthermore, while in the movie three members of the revenge squad are assassinated, historian Michael Bar-Zohar, who wrote a book on the history of the revenge operations, told Reuters that only two officers involved in the mission were killed throughout its entirety. He also stated that, contrary to what Munich seems to imply, Black September was most likely not responsible for these assassinations because it had been effectively &ldquowiped off the map for months&rdquo as a result of the Mossad&rsquos operations against it. Moreover, although the field agents in Munich are tracking eleven Black September agents, some historians have written that those involved in the reprisal missions may have killed as many as eighteen Palestinians who played a role in the massacre.

Did the Assassins Feel Remorse and Guilt?

Lastly, unlike the one in the film, the actual hit team most likely did not experience doubts and regrets about their mission. Indeed, Aaron Klein, who interviewed fifty current and ex-Mossad agents for a book about Israel&rsquos response to the Munich massacre, said that none expressed reservations about any work they had ever done on behalf of the agency. A former Israeli special forces officer who took part in assassination missions during the 1980s agreed, calling the notion that any members of the hit team would question the morality of their mission &ldquofanciful,&rdquo and saying, &ldquowe all accepted the necessity of hitting at our enemies.&rdquo Shimron also told Reuters that Mossad offers psychological help for any operatives who have doubts about their work. It is for these reasons, then, that we can conclude that the hit teams which undertook reprisal missions against the members of Black September involved in the Munich massacre most likely did not experience the kinds of doubt those in the film did.

Accuracies of Munich

Despite these probable errors, Munich does have some factual basis. As noted earlier, Golda Meir did order the Mossad to track down and kill those responsible for the massacre. Furthermore, according to Klein, the actual Israeli hit team, like the one in Munich, took great lengths to prevent killing those not responsible for the massacre. Moreover, as in the film, in 1973 the Mossad launched a joint operation with the Israeli Defense Forces against Black September operatives located in Beirut, Lebanon. Still, overall, Munich is most likely a factually inaccurate film. It is little wonder, then, that Shimron called it &ldquoan absurd version of the modus operandi."

3 Answers 3

But why didn't they ask some snipers to resign from the armed forces and then hire them in the police force and deploy them?

In a Hollywood movie the police would call up the local army base who would have a crack team of snipers just sitting around. Some weaselly lawyer would point out it's illegal until some clever grunt suggests "why don't we just resign?" which they would at the drop of a hat. The snipers would race over with their sniper rifles, salute a few times, and take up positions. The kidnappers would all be killed. Heroic music plays. Roll credits.

Reality doesn't work like that. It moves a lot slower and clever legal tricks don't work.

The File: Origins of the Munich Massacre

Over eighty years of international turmoil, discriminatory agendas, and vicious acts of violence.… this is the haunting Olympic history of Israel and Palestine. Three people living in Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Jerusalem embark on distinct journeys that converge at “the file” their efforts to admit Palestine to the Olympics in the early twentieth century. Their pivotal roles in history have been purposely omitted from official record, kept secret, or forgotten. Why? Because of the “Nazi Olympics” in 1936 in Berlin. And because of the death in 1972 of eleven Israeli Olympic athletes in the Munich Massacre.

This book narrates the previously untold history of a Palestine Olympic Committee recognized before the creation of the State of Israel in 1948. It sheds light on some of the darkest events in sport history, exposing secretive relationships behind the doors of the Jerusalem YMCA, Nazi agitation, arrests, internments, and other intrigue in the complicated history of Israeli and Palestinian sport.

The File breaks new ground at the intersection of sport and politics—illuminating the hope, tension, and horror of the 20s, 30s, and 40s, the creation of the State of Israel and the Palestinian refugees, and the resulting guerrilla attack at the Olympics in Munich in 1972—and reveals a handful of heroes whose impact on athletes and international sport competitions is still felt today.

Consultant and researcher San Charles Haddad weaves a true and masterful tale of forgotten personalities in a conflict characterized by unabated venom, bringing hope and new questions in his wake. What will be the future of Israel and Palestine, and how might sport play a restorative role in the twenty-first century?

Black September

The potential threat posed by Palestinian terrorists was well known at the time. Israel and Palestine had been in conflict for years, and there was no clear end in sight. Following the Israeli War of Independence in 1949, Palestinians lost their homeland to Israel. In retaliation, the Palestinian Authority president Yasser Arafat formed and led the Fatah, a political and military organization whose goal was to regain control of Palestine. After rejecting a Two-State Solution, Palestinian Liberation fighters waged a series of guerrilla warfare attacks in an attempt to regain their homeland from the Israelis, according to History in Five.

After the Palestine Liberation Organization lost the Jordanian Civil War in 1971, the Black September organization was formed. Black September was the breakaway military faction of Fatah, and was comprised of even more radical members who conducted terrorist attacks against Israel and its citizens, according to Britannica. According to Sieber, this militant faction of the Fatah would be ready to "turn the Games into a political demonstration" for their cause, and were even "prepared to die . On no account can they be expected to surrender," via Sports Illustrated.

The Rise Of Black September

They named themselves after the 1970 Black September conflict between the Jordanian Armed Forces and Palestinian Liberation Organization, in which King Hussein of Jordan declared military rule over the country and murdered or expelled thousands of Palestinian fighters.

Black September retaliated with the assassination of Jordan’s Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal in November 1971 and the unsuccessful assassination attempt of Jordan’s ambassador to London, Zaid al-Rifai soon afterward. They were also suspected to be behind a number of other terrorist activities around the globe, including sending letter bombs to Israeli embassies around the world, sabotaging a German electrical plant, and the hijacking of Belgian aircraft Sabena Flight 572 to Israel.

But by far, Black September’s most notorious terrorist attack was the 1972 Munich Massacre. At the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich, Germany, members of Black September would kidnap and eventually execute 11 members of the Israeli Olympic team.

Co Rentmeester/The LIFE Picture Collection/Getty Images An armed German policeman, dressed as an athlete, stands around the corner from a balcony of a dormitory where members of the Black September terrorist group had earlier captured and were then holding a group of Israeli athletes hostage.

Germany, in an effort to not look especially militaristic on the global stage, had limited the amount of security at the games. Meanwhile, members of Black September had spent the weeks prior to the games planning their attack.

Munich Massacre - HISTORY

The Black September name is derived from the conflict in September 1970 when King Hussein of Jordan declared military rule in response to fedayeen of the PLO attempting to destabilize his Kingdom. The Jordanian operations against the PLO resulted in the deaths and expulsion of thousands of Palestinians from Jordan, and came to be known as “The Black September” in Palestinian lore.

Once inside the Olympic Village, the Black September members used stolen keys to enter two apartments being used by the Israeli team. Wrestling coach Moshe Weinberg fought the intruders, who shot him through his cheek and then forced him to help them find more hostages. Weinberg led them to Apartment 3 where the gunmen corralled six wrestlers and weightlifters as additional hostages. Weinberg had probably hoped that the strong wrestlers and weightlifters would have a chance of fighting off the attackers, but they were all surprised in their sleep and taken at gunpoint.

Weinberg later tried to attack and overpower the terrorists again but was shot dead in the attempt. Another athlete, weightlifter Yossef Romano, a veteran of the Six-Day War in June 1967, also attacked and wounded one of the terrorists before being shot and killed. The terrorists now had nine hostages.

The terrorists demanded the release of 234 Palestinians and non-Arabs jailed in Israel, along with two West German terrorists held in German prisons – Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof, founders of the West German Red Army Faction. To demonstrate their resolve and determination, the body of Weinberg was thrown out of the front door of the residence by the Black September group. Israel’s response was an absolute “no negotiation”, as according to the Israeli government policy it was believed that negotiations would appear weak and encourage terrorist groups to conduct more attacks.

On the other hand, it has been reported that the extremely embarrassed West German government offered the Palestinians an unlimited amount of money for the release of the athletes, as well as substituting the Israelis for high-ranking Germans. The kidnappers apparently rejected both offers. Munich Police Chief Manfred Schreiber, and Bruno Merk, Interior Minister of Bavaria, then tried to negotiate directly with the kidnappers and repeated the offer of an unlimited amount of money – which was once again rejected. Egyptian advisers to the Arab League, and an Egyptian member of the International Olympic Committee also tried to win concessions from the kidnappers. Although these efforts also failed to obtain the release of the hostages the efforts apparently convinced the terrorists that their demands were being considered, and their leader ended up granting a total of five extensions to their initial deadline.

At 4:30 pm on the 5th of September, a group of 38 Munich police officers was dispatched to the Olympic Village. Dressed in Olympic sweatsuits (some also wearing helmets and carrying sub-machine guns), they had no experience in combat or hostage rescue but they planned to simply crawl down the ventilation shafts and kill the terrorists. They police took up their positions and awaited the codeword to begin their assault. All the while, and inconceivably, camera crews filmed the actions of the officers and broadcast the images live on television – giving the terrorists a detailed view of what the police were doing to prepare for an attack. After the terrorist leader threatened to kill two of the hostages immediately unless the police retreated, the attack was called off and the police retreated from the premises.

At 6 pm Munich time, the Palestinians issued a new dictate, demanding transportation to Cairo, and the authorities feigned agreement to this demand. Two Bell UH-1 military helicopters were to transport the terrorists and hostages to nearby Fürstenfeldbruck, a NATO airbase – where the authorities now planned to conduct an armed assault on the terrorists.

Five West German policemen were deployed around the airport in sniper roles—three on the roof of the control tower, one hidden behind a service truck and one behind a small signal tower at ground level. However, none of them had any special sniper training, nor any special weapons. The “snipers” were equipped with standard H&K G3 battle rifles, without optical sights or night vision devices. The officers were later said to have been selected simply because they shot competitively on weekends and were considered the best shooters on the force.

A Boeing 727 jet was positioned on the tarmac with sixteen West German police inside dressed as flight crew. The plan was that the West Germans would overpower the terrorist leaders as they boarded the plane, giving the snipers a chance to kill the remaining terrorists at the helicopters. At this time, based on faulty intel, it was thought that there were only 5 terrorists. However, when the terrorists and their hostages arrived at the airport, the team discovered that there were actually eight of them. Upon making this discovery, the police aboard the airplane voted to abandon their mission, without consulting the central command. None of them were ever reprimanded for this desertion of their duties.

The helicopters carrying the hostages and their captors had landed just after 10:30 pm. The pilots and six of the kidnappers emerged, and while four of the Black September members held the pilots at gunpoint, the terrorist leader and his adjutant walked over to inspect the jet. Finding it empty, they realized they had been lured into a trap and ran back toward the helicopters. As they passed the control tower, Sniper 3 took a shot opportunity to eliminate the group’s leader. However, due to the poor lighting (as well as the critical lack of proper training or equipment), he only managed to wound him in the thigh. Meanwhile, the authorities gave the order for the other snipers to open fire on their targets. This occurred at around 11:00 pm local time.

In the ensuingly chaotic gun battle, the two kidnappers holding the helicopter pilots were killed, while the remaining gunmen scrambled to return fire from behind and beneath the helicopters, out of the snipers’ line of sight. They also shot out many of the airport lights – plunging the area into deeper darkness. A West German policeman in the control tower was killed by their gunfire. The helicopter pilots fled – leaving the hostages tied up inside the aircraft and unable to escape the fusillade of bullets from both sides.

At four minutes past midnight of 6 September, one of the terrorists turned on the bound hostages in one of the helicopters and fired at them with a Kalashnikov assault rifle at point-blank range. The attacker then pulled the pin on a hand grenade and tossed it into the cockpit. The ensuing explosion destroyed the helicopter and incinerated the hostages.

What happened to the remaining hostages is still a matter of dispute. A German police investigation indicated that one of their sharpshooters and a few of the hostages may have been shot inadvertently by the police. However, a Time magazine reconstruction of the long-suppressed Bavarian prosecutor’s report indicates that a third kidnapper stood at the door of the other helicopter and raked the remaining five hostages with automatic fire from his Kalashnikov. Autopsies on the bodies of the Israeli athletes recovered from that helicopter showed that they had each been shot an average of four times each.

When the gunfire and explosions had subsided, three of the remaining terrorists, one of them feigning death, were captured by police. Another one escaped the scene, but was tracked down with police dogs 40 minutes later in a parking lot. Cornered and bombarded with tear gas, he was shot dead after a brief gunfight. By around 1:30 am on 6 September, the battle was over.

It is no secret that the West German authorities handling of this situation was woefully amateurish – at best. It was known a half-hour before the hostages and kidnappers had even arrived at Fürstenfeldbruck that the number of terrorists was larger than first believed. However, despite this new information, it was decided to continue with the rescue operation as originally planned. What’s more, the new information could not be relayed to the sharpshooter, as they had no radios. Not that it would have really made much difference – there were not enough snipers to take out all the terrorists in the first volley, they had no telescopic or night vision sights, and they weren’t even properly trained snipers for that matter either. Finally, the crisis command team consisted only of the Federal Interior Minister and the Bavarian Interior Minister and the Munich Chief of Police – none of whom had any proper training or successful experience in hostage negotiations, hostage rescue operations, or anti-terrorist operations.

This disaster did however directly lead to the founding less than two months later of the famous West German Border Guard anti-terrorist unit GSG 9 under the leadership of Ulrich Wegener – who was himself present at the airport battle. Spurred on by the embarrassment and tragic outcome of the Munich Massacre, Herr Wegener and his men went on to become one of the most highly respected and successful anti-terror units in history.

The political ramifications for West Germany however were not quite so good. The government delivered the bodies of the five Palestinian attackers killed during the Fürstenfeldbruck gun battle were to Libya, where they received heroes’ funerals and were buried with full military honours. On 29 October, Lufthansa Flight 615 was hijacked and the attackers threatened to blown the plane and all its passengers sky high if the three surviving Black September gunmen arrested after the Fürstenfeldbruck gunfight were not released. The Munich terrorists were immediately released by the West German government and received a tumultuous welcome when they touched down in Libya. They also held a press conference in Libya to give their own firsthand account of the operation. This was broadcast worldwide. Further international investigations into the Lufthansa Flight 615 incident have produced theories of a secret agreement between the German government and Black September in exchange for assurances of no further attacks on Germany. In a further embarrassment, it was also later established that West German neo-Nazis had given the Black September group logistical assistance for the Munich operation.

The Israeli response was a bit more robust than the German’s. On 8 September, Israeli planes bombed ten PLO bases in Syria and Lebanon in response to the massacre, killing scores of militants and civilians. The Israeli Prime Minister, Mrs. Golda Meir and the Israeli Defense Committee secretly authorized the Mossad to track down and kill those allegedly responsible for the Munich massacre. This mission later became known as Operation ‘Spring of Youth’ and Operation ‘Wrath of God’, but was not considered as a simple case of revenge. Members of the Israeli services involved in these operations at the time have stated that the view of the Israeli government was that it had no alternative but to exact justice and to show the terrorists, and the world, that Israel would not bow to such attacks.

Perhaps the final chapter of the story of that terrible day in September 1972 was provided by the last surviving member of the Black September group- Mohammad Daoud Oudeh, commonly known by his nom de guerre Abu Daoud. Daoud was the mastermind behind the Munich massacre. He planned the operation in July 1972, briefed the execution cell on the specifics of the operation, and accompanied the members of the execution cell to the Olympic Village by taxi on the night/early morning of the attack. It was on the evening of 4 September 1972, the day before the operation commenced in the early morning of 5 September 1972, that Abu Daoud briefed the assassination squad and issued final instructions over dinner in a restaurant at the Munich railway station.

In his autobiography, Palestine: From Jerusalem to Munich, in which he describes how he planned and executed the Munich operation, and later in a written interview with Sports Illustrated, Abu Daoud wrote that funds for the Munich operation were provided by Mahmoud Abbas, Chairman of the PLO since 11 November 2004, and President of the Palestinian National Authority since January 2005. Abu Daoud believed that if the Israelis knew that Mahmoud Abbas was the financier of the operation, the 1993 Oslo Accords, during which Mahmoud Abbas was seen in photo ops at the White House, would not have been achieved. Finally, Abu Daoud also stated that Yassir Arafat had full knowledge of the Munich attack, and had given it his full endorsement – claiming that Arafat saw the team off on the mission with the words “God protect you.” In 1999, the Palestinian Prize for Culture was granted to Abu Daoud for his book Palestine: From Jerusalem to Munich. As part of the prize, Abu Daoud was awarded 10,000 French francs.

Abu Daoud died of kidney failure aged 73 on 3 July 2010 in Damascus, Syria. In a condolence letter to Abu Daoud’s family following his death, Chairman of the Palestinian Authority Mahmoud Abbas wrote, “He is missed. He was one of the leading figures of Fatah and spent his life in resistance and sincere work as well as physical sacrifice for his people’s just causes.” If anyone wants to go piss on his grave, he is buried in the Martyrs Cemetery of the Yarmouk Palestinian refugee camp on the southern outskirts of Damascus.


Just a week before the attack, a 17 year old Mudslime decided to go for the high score by using nothing but an axe and his own brute strength. He critically injured a few NPCs before getting shot and wasted by the cops. ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack, like they did for the Paris Mass Shooting that killed over a hundred, and the Nice Truck Attack 2016 that pwn'd 80+ noobs, just a few weeks ago.

The perpetrator was bullied in school for being a fatass, having no friends and playing videogames all day. He decided to take matters into his own hands and would deal with his tormentors in a calm, rational manner.

If Ali had not an heroed and had surrendered to the police he would have been considered a minor (under 21) and would have faced a maximum sentence of 10 years. Germany does not have a death penalty unlike more enlightened nations.

Steam Activities

Like 99.85% of ALL PC Gamers, David had an account on the Steam gaming service 3 of them, in fact. Two of his alts got vac b& due to hax0ring, leaving only his main, † NΞΘ† GҽR†™, pure. He is known to have used pictures and names of mass murderers like Tim Kretschmer and Anders Behring Breivik for his steam identity. He was a skiddie who used hacks on Counter-Strike, and hax0red over 9000 dollars in GTA Online. He was known to be antisocial, quiet, and private about his personal life, but showed admiration for Alt-right politics, and great hostility to Turkroaches. He was also in several troll groups on steam, such as Jeff Weise, Anti-Refugee Club, Adam Lanza, Littleton Residents, Columbine High School - Class of '99, etc. A friend of his was arrested after some faggots on le reddit snitched his profile out to the cops, due to having lulzy and edgy shit on his profile. Most of the friends of the shooter who lived in Germany got paid a visit by the cops, had their computers confiscated, or been v&.

Olympics Massacre: Munich - The real story

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Shortly after 4am on 5 September 1972, eight heavily armed militants from Black September, a faction of the PLO, arrived on the outskirts of Munich and scaled a perimeter fence protecting thousands of athletes sleeping in the Olympic Village.

Carrying assault rifles and grenades, the Palestinians ran towards No 31 Connollystrasse, the building housing the Israeli delegation to the Munich Olympic Games. Bursting into the first apartment, they took a group of Israeli officials and trainers hostage: Yossef Gutfreund, Amitzur Shapira, Kehat Shorr, Andrei Spitzer, Jacov Springer and Moshe Weinberg.

In another apartment, they captured the Israeli wrestlers and weightlifters Eliezer Halfin, Yossef Romano, Mark Slavin, David Berger (an Israeli-American law graduate) and Zeev Friedman. When the tough Israelis fought back, the Palestinians opened fire, shooting Romano and Weinberg dead. The other nine were subdued and taken hostage. The Palestinians then demanded the release of 234 prisoners held in Israeli jails.

So began a siege and a tragedy that remains one of the most significant terror attacks of modern times. The assault, and the nature of the Israeli response, thrust the Israeli-Palestinian crisis into the world spotlight, set the tone for decades of conflict in the Middle East, and launched the new era of international terrorism. Olympic events were suspended, and broadcasters filled the time on expensive new satellite connections by switching to live footage from Connollystrasse. A TV audience of 900 million viewers in more than 100 countries watched with lurid fascination.

Initially the Palestinians seemed to relish the attention. They felt the world had ignored them for decades. But after a day of missed deadlines, "Issa", the Black September leader, wearied of negotiations. During the evening he demanded a plane to fly his men and the Israelis to the Middle East. German officials agreed to move the group in helicopters to Fürstenfeldbruck airfield base on the outskirts of Munich, where a Boeing 727 would be waiting to fly them to Cairo. Secretly, however, the Germans began planning a rescue operation at the airfield.

Zvi Zamir, the head of Mossad, Israel's intelligence agency, arrived in Munich when the plan was finalised and was flown to the airfield just ahead of the hostages and terrorists. "When we got to Fürstenfeldbruck, it was very dark," said Zamir. "I couldn't believe it. We would have had the field flooded with lights. I thought they might have had more snipers or armoured cars hiding in the shadows. But they didn't. The Germans were useless. Useless, all the way."

Just as the Palestinians and Israelis were about to land at Fürstenfeldbruck a group of German policemen on the 727 took a fateful decision and abandoned their positions. Five German snipers were then left to tackle eight well-armed Palestinians. The hostages and terrorists landed at the airfield at 10.40pm. Issa realised it was a trap and the German snipers opened fire, missing their targets. A gunfight began, and bullets sliced through the control tower where Zamir was standing. Then a stalemate developed and Zamir realised the Germans had no idea what to do.

An hour of sporadic gunfire ended when German armoured cars lumbered on to the airfield. The gunner in one car accidentally shot a couple of men on his own side, and the Palestinians apparently thought they were about to be machine-gunned. A terrorist shot four of the hostages in one helicopter as another Palestinian tossed a grenade inside. The explosion ignited the fuel tank, and the captive Israelis burned. Another terrorist then shot the Israelis in the other helicopter. Germans present at the airfield still remember the screams. Eleven Israelis, five Palestinians and one German police officer died during the Munich tragedy. The unprecedented attack, siege and massacre had a huge impact. In many ways it was the 9/11 of the 1970s. Suddenly the world realised terror was not confined to the Middle East.

For Israel, the sight of Jews dying again on German soil, just a few decades after the Holocaust, was simply too much. Israel struck back hard. Warplanes bombed Palestinian "military bases", killing many militants, but also scores of innocent civilians and children. Hundreds of Palestinians joined militant groups in response.

When Germany released the three Black September guerrillas who survived the Munich massacre, after a fabricated plane hijacking, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir then launched a secret operation, known by some as "Wrath of God", to hunt and kill those responsible for Munich. The exploits of the Israeli agents involved in Wrath of God are the stuff of legend and cheap farce. Over the next 20 years Israeli agents killed dozens of Palestinians. They hid landmines under car seats, devised ingenious bombs, and claim to have found and killed two of the three terrorist survivors of Munich.

The first to die was Wael Zwaiter, a Palestinian intellectualwho lived in Rome. On the evening of 16 October 1972, Zwaiter was ambling home to his flat in the north of the city and entered his block just after 10.30pm. Two Israeli agents emerged from the shadows and fired 12 bullets into his body at close range. Zwaiter died in the entrance hall.

The assassins then turned their attention to Dr Mahmoud Hamshari, the PLO's representative in France, who lived in Paris with his French wife Marie-Claude and their daughter Amina. Mossad agents have since claimed he was the head of Black September in France, but offer no real evidence. In early December 1972, while an Israeli agent posing as an Italian journalist met Hamshari in a café, at least two Israeli explosives experts entered his apartment and planted a small explosive device under a table by his telephone.

The next day, after Marie-Claude had left to take Amina to school, the "Italian journalist" rang Hamshari at his home.

"Is that you, Mr Hamshari?" asked the Israeli agent in Arabic. "Yes, I am Mahmoud Hamshari," came the response.

The Israelis immediately detonated their bomb. Hamshari was conscious for long enough to tell astonished Parisian detectives what had happened, but he later died in hospital.

Other Palestinians were eliminated in the following months, before the Israelis launched their most daring operation, sending an elite squad of soldiers into Beirut to kill three senior Palestinians. Ehud Barak, the leader of Sayeret Matkal, the Israeli SAS, and later Israeli Prime Minister, led the mission disguised as a woman, with a black wig and make-up, and hand grenades in his bra. "I wore a pair of trousers because the skirts in fashion then were a little short and narrow," Barak has said. "I also had a very stylish bag, big enough for plenty of explosives."

The killings went on for at least two decades. Mossad agents have tried to claim they targeted Palestinians directly connected with the 1972 massacre. But only a couple of the Palestinians shot or blown to pieces during the operation appear to have been directly connected with the Olympic attack. Instead the dead were mainly Palestinian intellectuals, politicians and poets. And the consequences of these so-called "targeted killings" for Israel have been appalling.

Assassination was not a regular Israeli tactic until Munich. Occasionally Israeli agents sent letter bombs to scientists developing rockets for enemy states, but it was Golda Meir who set a precedent for wholesale use of murder as a counterterrorism policy by authorising an assassination campaign in the aftermath of Munich. Since then assassination has been used to kill scores of terrorists and senior militants, including many of those responsible for major bomb attacks in Israel. In the absence of political solutions, the Israeli government and people have come to rely on targeted killings as their standard response to bombings.

However, many intelligence experts and senior Mossad officials privately admit targeted killings do not work. Assassinations spur revenge attacks on Israelis, and attacks can also go wrong. During Wrath of God, Israeli agents murdered an innocent waiter in Lillehammer, Norway. Several agents were captured and jailed. Then there are the moral and legal issues surrounding targeted killings. During Operation Wrath of God Israeli agents often killed their prey when alone. But since targeted killings became standard policy Israel has repeatedly fired missiles or dropped large bombs on targets, killing bystanders.

Until 11 September 2001, Israel was the only democratic nation obviously using targeted killings to counter terrorism. In July that year, the head of the Israeli army was forced to defend the killings after criticism from the Bush administration. But after 9/11 US policy shifted and Washington prepared a list of terrorists the CIA was authorised to kill. US officials even began studying Wrath of God for tips on how they could strike at al-Qa'ida. In November 2002, a senior al-Qa'ida commander was killed in Yemen when his car was hit by a missile fired by a pilotless US Predator.

Like their Israeli counterparts, American officials have found that once assassination is used as an occasional tactic it has a habit of becoming the norm. Predators have since been used in dozens of attacks in Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen and other countries. US officials have even responded to the quagmire in Iraq by proposing the creation of special elite squads, managed or assisted by US forces. Yet using blunt military force against terrorists does not work. Even the supposedly clinical killings conducted by Israeli teams in response to the Munich massacre did not stop terrorism. Israelis are still dying in terror attacks.

Spielberg's Munich movie is unlikely to have much of an impact on the Israeli-Palestinian crisis. But it might help to remind people that state-sanctioned assassination campaigns have failed as a tactic against terrorism. Perhaps the film could also make audiences realise that if serious action had been taken after Munich to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian crisis, then 9/11 would probably never have happened.

Simon Reeve is the author of 'One Day in September', the full story of the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre, Faber & Faber, £6.99

Big Screen: Fact, fiction and the art of film-making

The Munich massacre seems an unlikely subject for Steven Spielberg to choose as the basis for his new blockbuster.

Observers had long thought of the director as a great friend of Israel. Yet with 'Munich' Spielberg has managed to anger the Israeli government, former Mossad agents, and Palestinian militants from Black September.

Spielberg's failure to contact a number of key figures while making the film has not helped. Nor has his choice of source material. The provenance of 'Vengeance', a book by the Canadian writer George Jonas, has been questioned since it was first published in 1984.

Last summer Ariel Sharon, the Israeli Prime Minister, discovered that Spielberg had been working on the movie script with the leading left-wing American playwright Tony Kushner, who has been critical of Israeli government policies. Infuriated, Sharon gave authorisation for several former Mossad members of the assassination campaign to tell their side of the story to journalists and documentary-makers, most notably the makers of an excellent new BBC documentary, 'Munich'.

The Israeli government has since waged a whispering campaign against Spielberg's movie. Officials have made it clear they think the film is "superficial" and "pretentious". Several US critics have complained that Spielberg depicts the Palestinians and the Israelis as equally culpable.

But Spielberg has strived to offer balance in a movie everyone will watch burdened by preconceptions. The suffering and death of the Israeli athletes and officials in Munich is returned to repeatedly during the film. Palestinians are actually portrayed as human beings: no small feat in a Hollywood offering.

Yet Spielberg has not made a documentary. There is no historical context and only the briefest mention of Israeli bombing raids on Palestinian camps after the Munich massacre. And while many of the Wrath of God assassinations are accurately represented, there is plenty more that is either wrong or fabricated.

Watching the film I was enthralled yet troubled. Like it or not, it is Spielberg who is deciding how the tragedy will be remembered.

'Munich', the Spielberg movie, is released this week. 'Munich', the BBC2 documentary, is on Tuesday at 11.20pm


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